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Abstract
The epistemic basic structure of a society consists of those institutions that
have the greatest impact on individuals’ opportunity to obtain knowledge on
questions they have an interest in as citizens, individuals, and public officials.
It plays a central role in the production and dissemination of knowledge and
in ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate this knowledge. It
includes institutions of science and education, the media, search engines, li-
braries, museums, think tanks, and various government agencies. This article
identifies two demands of justice that apply specifically to the institutions
that belong to it. First, the epistemic basic structure should serve all citizens
fairly and reliably. It should provide them with the opportunity to acquire
knowledge they need for their deliberations about the common good, their
individual good, and how to pursue them. Second, the epistemic basic struc-
ture should produce and disseminate the knowledge that various experts and
public officials need to successfully pursue justice and citizens need to ef-
fectively exercise their rights. After arguing for these duties, I discuss what
policies follow from them and respond to the worry that these duties have
illiberal implications.
1 Introduction
Would raising the minimum wage help or harm the worst-off? Should I vaccinate
my child against measles, mumps, and rubella? Is genetically modified food bad
for me? These are typical questions we face in public and individual deliberation.
They are also impossible to answer by ourselves. If we as individuals or a society
are to make up our minds on such questions in an informed way, several social
conditions need to be met. There needs to be well-conducted research on these
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questions. This research needs to be disseminated in a manner we can comprehend
and through channels we can access. Finally, we should have the education and
intellectual skills necessary for understanding and evaluating the findings presented
to us. If even one of these conditions is not fulfilled, then our choice will be one
likely to fail us.
The satisfaction of these conditions depends on the well-functioning of a num-
ber of diverse institutions that together make up the epistemic basic structure of a
society. It consists of those institutions that have the greatest impact on individuals’
opportunity to obtain knowledge they need to deliberate about the common good,
their individual good and how to pursue them. These are the institutions that play a
central role in the production and dissemination of knowledge and in determining
people’s ability to assimilate the knowledge disseminated. It includes institutions of
science and education, the media, search engines, libraries, museums, think tanks,
and various government agencies.1
The institutions that belong to the epistemic basic structure are bound by the
principles of justice that apply to all social institutions. They are not allowed to
discriminate on the basis of people’s sex, race, or religion. Scientists have to respect
the rights of individuals when they carry out experiments. Institutions of education
have a crucial role in ensuring fair equality of opportunity. But beyond these, are
there requirements of justice that apply specifically to the institutions of the epis-
temic basic structure in their role as producers and disseminators of knowledge?
In this article, I identify two such requirements based on Rawls’s theory of jus-
tice. First, the epistemic basic structure of a society is required to serve citizens fairly
and provide them with the opportunity to gain knowledge on issues they need to be
informed about. This requirement has two grounds: citizens’ exercise and develop-
ment of their moral powers depends on knowledge about the common good, their
individual good and the pursuit thereof. For this reason such knowledge should be
considered a primary good and its fair distribution a matter of justice (Section 3).
Moreover, citizens will enjoy the fair value of the political liberties and full auton-
omy, as Rawls understands them, only if the epistemic basic structure of their soci-
ety serves all of them fairly and is well-functioning (Section 4). Thus, Rawls’s theory
can be extended to help us theorize distributive epistemic (in)justice.2 Even though
some philosophers have discussed the idea, it remains under-theorized.3 Existing
1. Faik Kurtulmus and Gürol Irzik, “Justice in the Distribution of Knowledge,” Episteme 14, no.
2 (2017): 129–146.
2. Miranda Fricker introduces the concept, but not the term, at the beginning of her ground-
breaking book—but only to signal that it is not what she is interested in. Miranda Fricker, Epistemic
Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1. In a later
article she helpfully distinguishes between discriminatory epistemic injustice, which includes both
hermeneutic and testimonial injustice, and distributive epistemic injustice. She argues that both fall
under the “umbrella concept epistemic injustice”. Miranda Fricker, “Epistemic Justice as a Condi-
tion of Political Freedom?,” Synthese 190, no. 7 (2013): 1318. Kurtulmus and Irzik, “Justice in the
Distribution of Knowledge” offers an account of distributive epistemic justice without employing the
term.
3. Laura Beeby, “A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111,
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discussions offer an incomplete account of why distributive epistemic (in)justice
matters. They also do not address how it should be incorporated into existing the-
ories of justice, which institutions are responsible for bringing it about, and what
its policy implications are.
Second, justice requires that the epistemic basic structure produce and dissem-
inate the expert knowledge necessary for the design and effective implementation
of just laws and policies (Section 5). I discuss some policies that would follow from
these considerations in section 6. In Section 7, I respond to the worry that ensuring
that the epistemic basic structure serves the public in a reliable and fair way requires
illiberal measures. People’s opportunity to acquire knowledge is shaped not only by
the epistemic basic structure but also by how the rest of the basic structure is orga-
nized. Given my focus on the epistemic basic structure, the account of distributive
epistemic (in)justice I offer is partial. I discuss what a fully comprehensive account
would also need to address in Section 8.
I offer my arguments within the Rawlsian framework, but they can be gener-
alized to cover other liberal egalitarian theories. I adopt this framework because it
is much more explicit about what goods are being distributed and which institu-
tions are responsible for their distribution than other theories. Moreover, Rawls
discusses the demands of justice that apply to some of the institutions that belong
to the epistemic basic structure. Thus, it is easier to document the deficiencies of
Rawls’s account, which I do in the next section. Theories of distributive justice that
employ different metrics of justice, such as various welfarist accounts, implicitly
take the same institutions and the same goods to be their focus in thinking about
the implementation of their principles. Insofar as this is the case, the arguments
offered here provide a corrective to them as well—not in terms of the metric of
justice but in terms of what other goods and institutions matter for the pursuit of
justice as they understand it.
One final clarification. By “knowledge” I shall mean what Alvin Goldman,
in his veritistic social epistemology, calls weak knowledge. Weak knowledge is
just true belief: it does not incorporate requirements such as justification, warrant
or conditions to rule out Gettier cases, that are necessary for what Goldman calls
strong knowledge.4 I opt for Goldman’s definition primarily because my arguments
rest on the instrumental benefits of true beliefs, which do not readily generalize
to the other requirements for strong knowledge. Furthermore, on most accounts,
no. 3pt3 (2011): 479–486; David Coady, “Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice,” Episteme 7, no. 2
(2010): 101–113; Don Fallis, “Epistemic Value Theory and the Digital Divide,” in Information Tech-
nology and Social Justice, ed. Emma Rooksby and John Weckert (Hershey, PA: Information Science
Publishing, 2007), 29–46; Emma Rooksby and Jeroen van den Hoven, “Distributive Justice and the
Value of Information: A (Broadly) Rawlsian Approach,” in Information Technology and Moral Philos-
ophy, ed. Jeroen van den Hoven and John Weckert (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008),
376–96. Van den Hoeven and Rooksby discuss distributive epistemic (in)justice in relation to Rawls’s
theory. However, their approach is limited to the distribution of “informative objects” and does not
address the role of the epistemic basic structure in the production, dissemination and assimilation of
knowledge.
4. Alvin I Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 23-4.
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strong knowledge contains an element of individual cognitive performance. This is
the responsibility of individuals and not the institutions that I shall be concerned
with—even though the relevant cognitive abilities are shaped by the epistemic basic
structure.
2 Rawls on knowledge and the epistemic basic structure
Rawls notes the significance of knowledge for individuals at several points. He
often speaks of “the full and informed exercise” of the two moral powers and takes
freedom of thought and speech to be a primary good for that reason.5 He notes that
ignorance as well as poverty can undermine the worth of basic liberties6 and explic-
itly mentions access to knowledge about political issues as a requirement of equal
political participation.7 His discussion of education also recognizes the importance
of knowledge. He observes that the importance of equal access to education is not
limited to its role in achieving fair equality of opportunity. Beyond this, it helps
secure individuals’ sense of self-worth by enabling them to take part in the cultural
life of their society.8 It also prepares them for taking part in the political process
by informing them of their rights and encouraging political virtues.9 It is for these
reasons as well as for ensuring fair equality of opportunity that he advocates pub-
licly funded education. Yet, his account neglects the role of the rest of the epistemic
basic structure and the joint cooperation of all of its components in ensuring that
people are well-informed. He seems to assume that public education and freedom
of expression are sufficient.10
Even though its impact is also “profound and present from the start”, the epis-
temic basic structure is not a part of the basic structure, which, for Rawls, is the pri-
mary subject of justice.11 While he notes the importance of universities and “learned
and scientific societies” as being “a vital part of the background culture”, he main-
tains that they do not have any duties of justice that specifically apply to them.12
They are bound by the demands of justice that apply to all associations. Thus, they
“may be restricted in various ways, for example, by what is necessary to maintain
the basic equal liberties…and fair equality of opportunity”, but that is all.13 Even
5. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 308, 310,
314, 319, 324, 332, emphasis added.
6. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 325.
7. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 198.
8. Rawls, Theory, 86-7, 91-2.
9. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 199-200.
10. With a few exceptions, political philosophers working within the Rawlsian framework have also
neglected the institutions that make up the epistemic basic structure. There are two notable recent ex-
ceptions. Carl Fox, “Public Reason, Objectivity, and Journalism in Liberal Democratic Societies,” Res
Publica 19, no. 3 (August 2013): 257–273; Zeynep Pamuk, “Justifying Public Funding for Science,”
British Journal of Political Science 49, no. 1 (2019): 1–16.
11. Rawls, Theory, 7.
12. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 215.
13. Rawls, 261.
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more tellingly, Rawls maintains that public funding of sciences is not required by
justice.14 His discussion of the media, another central component of the epistemic
basic structure, also fails to address the significance of its organization. Except for
one passing reference to the importance of assuring “even access to public media”
for realizing the fair value of the political liberties, his discussion is limited to free-
dom of the press.15 Thus, while Rawls recognizes the importance of knowledge and
some of the institutions that belong to the epistemic basic structure, he does not
think that it has specific duties of justice.
As my summary of Rawls’s treatment of the importance of knowledge and my
discussions in the next sections should make clear, I do not argue that there is a fun-
damental philosophical error in Rawls’s theory. On the contrary, I think his theory
can help us think about what a just epistemic basic structure would look like. The
error lies in Rawls’s social theory. And this is understandable. He was writing at
a time when universities and other institutions of science enjoyed substantial pub-
lic funding and freedom from commercial pressures; the news media was not as
heavily monopolized or short of resources; and social media was non-existent. The
corporate machinery to mislead the public on important scientific issues, such as the
harms of tobacco or climate change, had not reached the same levels of sophistica-
tion. Things have changed. There is now an urgent need to think about the duties
and the proper organization of the epistemic basic structure in a liberal democratic
society.
Theorizing about the requirements of justice that apply to the epistemic basic
structure matters for four reasons. Most obviously, the epistemic basic structure
has a profound impact on society and the lives of its citizens. Not to address it in a
theory of justice is a serious omission.
Second, it is important to address society’s and citizens’ need for knowledge
systematically. The institutions that belong to the epistemic basic structure serve
non-epistemic as well as epistemic ends. Institutions of education, for instance,
prepare individuals not only to reason well and acquire knowledge but also to par-
ticipate in the economy. Scientific research not only provides us with knowledge
about the world but can also help develop new technologies that have economic
benefits. Such contributions of the epistemic basic structure are much more tangi-
ble and apparent than its epistemic contributions. They can overshadow other con-
siderations and this can, ultimately, distort the functioning of the epistemic basic
structure. An accurate sense of why the epistemic benefits that a well-functioning
epistemic basic structure provides matters can guard us from such errors.
It is also critical to see that the epistemic needs of individuals and society ground
requirements of justice. This matters because measures that serve epistemic needs
of citizens will sometimes compete with other requirements of justice. To cite an
obvious example, the financial resources that go to scientific research could be used
14. Rawls, Theory, 291 For an excellent discussion, see Pamuk, “Justifying Public Funding for Sci-
ence,” 6-9.
15. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
2001), 149.
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to economically benefit the worst-off. Therefore, it is important that the epistemic
needs of individuals and society enter into our deliberations as considerations of
justice so that they are not outweighed by other considerations.
And finally, we need to think about the duties of the epistemic basic structure
holistically. Thinking about the institutions within it in isolation will mislead us.
They mutually influence each other and it is their joint operation that determines
what citizens and public officials know. Practices that seem unproblematic when
viewed individually can have negative outcomes in the aggregate. Here is one in-
stance of this complex interaction. As one might expect, the research that makes it
into the news media is more likely to be cited.16 This, in turn, creates incentives for
scientists to pursue research that will be picked by the media. It also leads scientists
and university press offices to disseminate results in an exaggerated fashion which
is then relayed, in the same fashion, to the public by journalists.17 When, in the
end, members of the public are misinformed about, for instance, the benefits of a
health intervention this will not be down to any single actor. Measures to address
such failures should, accordingly, be designed with the epistemic basic structure as
a whole in mind.
3 Knowledge as a primary good
The idea of primary goods, as set out in Rawls’s later works, relies on a normative
account of the person. According to Rawls, individuals have two moral powers:
a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good. The
former is the capacity to reflect and act on the demands of justice. The latter is the
capacity to rationally reflect and act on one’s individual ends.18 Primary goods are
the means necessary for developing and exercising these two moral powers as well
as pursuing diverse conceptions of the good.19
Though absent from Rawls’s list of primary goods, knowledge should be con-
sidered a primary good because it is necessary for the development and exercise of
both moral powers.20 In order to form a conception of the good life and to re-
vise it rationally, people need knowledge of various conceptions of the good life,
the knowledge that is relevant to evaluating them and various intellectual skills.21
Knowledge plays an indispensable role in our deliberations about which ends to
pursue. If we have made our life plans in light of false beliefs, only knowledge can
16. D. P. Phillips et al., “Importance of the Lay Press in the Transmission of Medical Knowledge
to the Scientific Community,” The New England Journal of Medicine 325, no. 16 (1991): 1180–1183.
17. Petroc Sumner et al., “The Association Between Exaggeration in Health Related Science News
and Academic Press Releases: Retrospective Observational Study,” BMJ 349 (2014): g7015.
18. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 19.
19. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 307.
20. This section develops an argument briefly sketched out in Kurtulmus and Irzik, “Justice in the
Distribution of Knowledge,” 141.
21. This observation is also made in Rooksby and Hoven, “Distributive Justice and the Value of
Information: A (Broadly) Rawlsian Approach,” 382-3.
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help us make the necessary revisions. Having more of other primary goods can en-
able us to pursue our life plans more effectively but it cannot substitute for lack of
knowledge. Once people have drawn their life plans, they also need knowledge to
pursue them effectively. In the absence of an accurate conception of the world, their
plans in life will be thwarted even if they have resources such as income, wealth and
basic liberties.
Rawls’s understanding of the capacity for a conception of the good gives us
a further reason to be concerned with knowledge. For Rawls, this capacity has
a “regulative nature”. People have an interest in “affirming [their] way of life in
accordance with the full, deliberate, and reasoned exercise of [their] intellectual and
moral powers”.22 Such exercise of rationality depends on the possession of various
intellectual skills, conceptual resources and knowledge provided by the epistemic
basic structure.
Knowledge is also necessary for the exercise and development of people’s sense
of justice through participating in the political process and deliberating about the
common good. As Charles Mills has emphasized, systemic ignorance about dif-
ferent social groups and their lives, or the nature of one’s society, can facilitate and
sustain injustice and relations of domination.23 In order to deliberate well about the
common good, citizens should know about the experiences, needs and condition of
other citizens. They also need to know numerous social and political facts such as
how their society is performing with regard to issues that bear on the common good
and which policies can further it. If the epistemic basic structure of our society does
not function properly, there is always the risk that we will end up supporting unjust
laws and policies due to our ignorance despite our individual efforts.
The epistemic basic structure is not our only source of knowledge. Some of the
knowledge that bears on our individual good or the common good, for example
knowledge about what activities one enjoys or the everyday experiences of people
in our society, is fairly local, non-formal and, often, first-hand.24 It does not de-
pend on extensive and institutional epistemic collaboration. In contrast, knowledge
about the conduct of the current government, the likely outcomes of various poli-
cies, the existing distribution of income and wealth, the workings of the criminal
justice system, the efficacy of various drugs, environmental risks our society faces
and so on require extensive and systematic social cooperation. It is this latter kind
of knowledge that the epistemic basic structure is primarily responsible for.
There is also an implicit limit on the domains of knowledge that grounds claims
of justice. Since knowledge should be treated as a primary good because of its role
in the exercise and development of the two moral powers, it is only knowledge that
is needed for these purposes that ground claims of justice. Not all questions that
22. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 313.
23. Charles W. Mills, “White Ignorance,” in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, ed. Shannon
Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 11–38.
24. For a discussion of the importance of knowledge that comes from first person experience of
disadvantage and interaction with people from different socials groups, see Elizabeth Anderson, “Fair
Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective,” Ethics 117, no. 4 (2007): 606-614.
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people are curious about make claims of justice on the epistemic basic structure of a
society. However, given that knowledge in different domains tend to be interrelated,
forming, as Quine puts it, a web of belief, the knowledge that bears on the exercise
of the two moral powers can be fairly extensive.
While it is knowledge that is a primary good, the principles of justice should
deal with the opportunity to acquire knowledge.25 Justice demands that people
enjoy equal opportunity to acquire knowledge they need as individuals and citizens
unless there are overriding reasons for an unequal distribution. Other demands
of justice are, of course, among these possibly overriding reasons. Inequalities of
opportunity to acquire knowledge are also justified when they are necessary for an
efficient division of epistemic labor in society that benefits everyone, or for the
effective pursuit of public ends. Thus, it is not unjust if scientists or public officials
enjoy better opportunities to acquire knowledge because of the nature of the tasks
they carry out.
Focusing on the distribution of the opportunity to acquire knowledge rather
than the distribution of knowledge makes room for individual choice and responsi-
bility. If someone has the opportunity to acquire knowledge about a certain matter
but remains ignorant through their own fault or choice, then this does not constitute
an injustice. It also accommodates the fallibility of inquiry. Even if the epistemic
basic structure functions well and individuals do their best, it is impossible to guar-
antee that people end up with true beliefs. Research, even when it is conducted
well, cannot guarantee truth. But it can be reliable in the sense that it has a high
objective probability of being true. By ensuring that there is reliable research, the
epistemic basic structure can maximize people’s opportunity to acquire knowledge.
Thus, while the ultimate goal is to provide citizens with the opportunity to acquire
knowledge, the policies that aim at it will seek to promote reliable inquiry.
Insofar as they pay attention to equality of opportunity to acquire knowledge,
political philosophers focus on inequalities or failings in education. Our vision
needs to be broadened and take in the epistemic basic structure as a whole. It has
to encompass the production and dissemination of knowledge as well. Production
and dissemination of knowledge that caters only to the needs of certain groups or is
unreliable can also undermine equality of opportunity to acquire knowledge. Thus,
the requirement that people ought to enjoy equal opportunity to acquire knowledge
amounts to the following. First, there should be reliable research responsive to
everyone’s needs for knowledge about the common good, their individual good and
their pursuit. Second, this research should be disseminated accurately and in a way
accessible to everyone. And finally, everyone should receive the education they need
to benefit from this knowledge.
25. This is not unique to knowledge. The same point applies to other primary goods like the powers
and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility. Even though they are primary goods, the
principles of justice apply not to them but to the opportunity to hold them. Rawls, Political Liberalism,
6, 181, 308; Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 58.
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4 Political liberties, full autonomy and knowledge
In the previous section, I argued that knowledge is a primary good and its distribu-
tion is a matter of justice. There are reasons to be concerned with the distribution
of knowledge to citizens and the organization of the epistemic basic structure even
if that argument is rejected. Citizens will enjoy full autonomy and political equality
only if the epistemic basic structure of their society functions well and serves them
fairly.
People’s chances of democratic participation and influence in the political pro-
cess depend on the knowledge they possess as well as the financial and other re-
sources they have. People who know more about their social world, how their po-
litical system works, and what policies will further their ends will be in a better
position to influence the political process. Therefore, inequalities in access to such
knowledge—whether they are due to unfairness in the production or dissemina-
tion of knowledge or in education—can produce significant inequalities in political
power that undermine the fair value of the political liberties in much the same way
that inequalities of income and wealth do.
The epistemic basic structure also affects the value of political liberties by shap-
ing what is common knowledge in a society, which, in turn. influences the process
of democratic deliberation and the citizens’ levels of political influence. If the epis-
temic basic structure neglects certain groups and favors others, then facts about the
neglected group will be less likely to become common knowledge, because there will
not be sufficient research on them, or it will not be disseminated widely. This will
be an impediment to members of groups neglected by the epistemic basic structure.
In order to make their case they will have to carry out research and inform the pub-
lic themselves whereas members of groups favored by the epistemic basic structure
can simply make their case with reference to what is common knowledge in their
society. It will be as if the democratic playing field in their society is epistemically
tilted against them.
An unfairly organized epistemic basic structure can undermine the fair value
of the political liberties and the integrity of the democratic process in other ways
too. If certain actors enjoy more influence over the production or dissemination
of knowledge, this can give them more political power, because they can shape the
public’s views. They can make sure that the public is exposed to more evidence
that favors their agenda by funding such research, selectively publishing results that
favor their agenda and disseminating it widely.26 By doing so, they can successfully
mislead the public without directly lying to them. Actors who want to mislead the
public can also do so by merely altering the accessibility of evidence available to the
public. For instance, just by altering search engine rankings, they can change the
voting preferences of undecided voters.27 Thus, the quality of public deliberation
26. James Owen Weatherall, Cailin O’Connor, and Justin P Bruner, “How to Beat Science and
Influence People: Policymakers and Propaganda in Epistemic Networks,” The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science.
27. Robert Epstein and Ronald E. Robertson, “The Search Engine Manipulation Effect (SEME)
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and whether citizens enjoy the fair value of the political liberties depend critically
on the organization of the epistemic basic structure.
Recent developments exacerbate this threat posed by powerful actors to the
democratic process and the quality of public deliberation. Thanks to the availability
of big data about individuals, improved computational methods and powers and
developments in the behavioral sciences, political campaigners can collect and pro-
cess individual level data about voters which enable them to carry out “deep and
individualized profiling and targeting”. This provides political campaigners and
those who own this data immense political advantages.28 Furthermore, by enabling
politicians to send out tailored messages to potential voters it undermines joint pub-
lic deliberation where politicians appeal to whole public and openly debate issues
of concern to all. Instead, political campaigners can target specific individuals and
rely on non-rational means of influence.
Let me now turn to the relationship between the epistemic basic structure and
full autonomy. According to Rawls, citizens enjoy full autonomy when they affirm
and act on the basis of principles of justice “they would give to themselves when
fairly represented as free and equal persons”.29 He maintains that citizens can enjoy
full autonomy only if the full publicity condition is satisfied.30 This condition is
satisfied when: (a) Citizens accept and know that others accept the principles of
justice, and know that their society is just according to these principles; (b) Citi-
zens know the facts that underlie the choice of principles of justice in the original
position; and (c) Citizens know, or can come to know if they choose to, the philo-
sophical justification for the principles of justice.31 This is a demanding ideal. Rawls
maintains that it is appropriate for free and equal people, because “if the basic struc-
ture relies on coercive sanctions… the grounds of its institutions should stand up
to public scrutiny”.32
There are two underlying thoughts here. First, in a just society citizens’ ad-
herence to the principles governing their society does not depend on false beliefs
or ignorance. Second, citizens can see for themselves that their society embodies
principles that treat them and their fellow citizens as free and equal persons. Thus,
they comply with the laws of their society in light of an accurate conception of their
social order and the normative principles that guide it.
The ideal of full autonomy and the condition of publicity place significant de-
mands on the epistemic basic structure of a society. These demands are not limited
to providing citizens with an education that enables them to understand the jus-
tification of the principles of justice that governs their society. Whether a society
and its Possible Impact on the Outcomes of Elections,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
of the United States of America 112, no. 33 (2015): E4512–E4521.
28. Zeynep Tufekci, “Engineering the Public: Big Data, Surveillance and Computational Politics,”
First Monday 19, no. 7 ( July 2014), accessed September 7, 2018, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.
php/fm/article/view/4901.
29. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 77.
30. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 78.
31. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 66-7; Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 121.
32. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 68.
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satisfies Rawls’s principles of justice is not something that one can just see.33 It
requires substantial research done by social scientists and journalists. It is only if
there is such research that is disseminated to the public through the news media
and other channels that they can see for themselves that their society is just and
thereby enjoy full autonomy.
This last argument suggests a sufficiency standard for the distribution of knowl-
edge, i.e. people ought to be able to acquire the knowledge they would need for the
realization of Rawls’s publicity condition. Can a similar sufficiency principle be
formulated to cover the other reasons offered in this and the previous section to
care about the distribution of knowledge? I think this cannot be done. In the case
of knowledge necessary for political equality, it is not just what people know that
matters. It is also how their knowledge compares to others: knowledge is, in this
context, a positional good.
If, as I argued in the previous section, knowledge is a primary good and we
remain within the Rawlsian framework, a principle of equal distribution with al-
lowance for inequality in light of other requirements of justice and considerations of
efficiency suggests itself. In order to recommend a different distributive standard
for knowledge, there would have to be a feature of knowledge that distinguishes
it from other primary goods that requires treating it differently. Moreover, there
does not seem to be a plausible threshold for sufficiency. Setting a threshold would
require determining which facts and known with what level of certainty is enough
for the development and exercise of the two moral powers. I doubt that this can be
done in a principled way.
5 The pursuit of justice and the epistemic basic structure
Much of the knowledge that the epistemic basic structure produces is highly tech-
nical and of no direct use to citizens. It is employed by legislators, policy makers,
judges, teachers, doctors, social workers and other public officials. It is crucial to the
effective pursuit of justice and benefits citizens indirectly. Thus, the second duty of
the epistemic basic structure of a society is to produce and disseminate knowledge
needed for just legislation, effective design and implementation of laws and poli-
cies,34 and for ensuring the protection and effective exercise of people’s basic rights.
The realization of Rawls’s principles of justice, or for that matter, any principle of
justice, depends on a well-ordered epistemic basic structure. I offer three illustra-
33. While very far from a just society, beliefs of Americans regarding public services provides useful
illustration. A significant portion of Americans who have benefited from government social programs
think they have not. Moreover, when they receive high quality public services they are likely to
attribute this service to the private sector due to its quality. Suzanne Mettler, “Reconstituting the
Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era,” Perspectives on Politics
8, no. 03 (2010): 803–824; Amy E. Lerman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Public Reputation
Crisis in America (And What We Can Do to Fix It) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2019),
89-115.
34. This is also noted by Pamuk, “Justifying Public Funding for Science,” 10-1.
11
tions. The vital role played by the epistemic basic structure in the pursuit of justice
comes out most clearly when we consider the knowledge necessary to implement
Rawls’s second principle of justice. The difference principle can only be success-
fully implemented if we have correctly identified the worst-off group, understand
how the economy is currently performing and know the outcomes of different eco-
nomic policies. This requires economics research that focuses on these questions
and research in disciplines that inform or underlie it, such as mathematics, statis-
tics and psychology. Research in a wide array of scientific disciplines is relevant
to the pursuit of fair equality of opportunity as well. Understanding the diverse
mechanisms through which families pass on their advantages to their offspring and
certain groups are held back, and what can be done to remove the obstacles dis-
advantaged groups face will not only depend in research in economics, but also in
psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Following Norman Daniels, Rawls has
suggested that the provision of healthcare should be taken as a requirement of fair
equality of opportunity.35 This will require reliable research in medicine, pharma-
cology, epidemiology and biology as well as research carried out by public health
bodies. The protection of basic liberties hinges on a properly functioning criminal
justice system.36 If the courts are not to infringe on individual liberties by falsely
convicting people, they should base their verdicts on reliable evidence. The epis-
temic basic structure plays a crucial role here. Much of the evidence the courts rely
on, such as forensic evidence, has the significance it has because of the scientific
research underlying it. If this research is biased or unreliable then it can result in
people being falsely convicted and losing their liberties.37 Scientific research can
also help the courts determine the reliability of non-scientific evidence and guide
its use. For instance, scientific research can inform the courts on how to draw tes-
timony from witnesses and how trustworthy their testimony is.38 Courts that rely
on unsound research or faulty assumptions can be a significant threat to liberty.
6 Policy implications
(i) I have argued that justice requires that there is reliable research on questions that
citizens and society need to be informed about. Such research is not only carried
out by institutions of science, such as universities and research centers. Journalists
and governmental agencies like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency and
35. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 174-6. For Daniels’ view see Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting
Health Needs Fairly (New York ; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
36. Rawls notes the connection between liberty and a well-functioning legal system in his discussion
of the rule of law. Rawls, Theory, 206-14.
37. Indeed, systematic reviews find much of the forensic evidence used in courts to be unreliable.
See, National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009).
38. For a discussion see, Adam Benforado, Unfair: The New Science of Criminal Injustice (New York:
Crown/Archetype, 2015), 108-32.
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the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the United States also carry out vital research.
Research required by justice is also not restricted to research in the natural and social
sciences. Research in the humanities contributes significantly to the exercise of the
two moral powers and the pursuit of justice by directly informing our reflections
about the ends we ought to pursue as individuals and as a society and providing us
with the resources to articulate our concerns.
What are the causal levers that can be used to make the production of knowl-
edge more in line with the demands of justice? The research agendas of researchers
are shaped by what counts as significant questions given the current states of their
disciplines, their sources of funding, and personal factors such as the social groups
they belong to.39 While it is difficult to directly alter what counts as significant
questions for a discipline, the other determinants can be changed.
Public and democratically controlled funding of research can support and in-
centivize research on issues required by justice. The principles of justice offer some
guidance on how research agendas should be set and how resources should be al-
located. However, these are fairly broad guidelines. More specific decisions will
require judgements about the moral priority of different research areas and topics.
These judgements will involve tradeoffs among competing values and will need to
be made in light of the comparative epistemic potentials and benefits of alternatives.
Making such decisions is the task of public deliberation. Thus, there needs to be
mechanisms for people to influence the setting of research agendas in an informed
and fair fashion such as the deliberative polls proposed by the philosopher of science
Philip Kitcher.40
Diversity among researchers can also contribute to the promotion of research
agendas that serve the whole public. The increasing inclusion in research insti-
tutions of previously excluded groups such as women, ethnic and racial minori-
ties, and members of the working class have transformed the social sciences, the
humanities and the medical sciences. Their inclusion has given rise to new disci-
plines, such as African American and Gender Studies, and put neglected questions
and approaches on the agendas of existing disciplines, such as the Women’s Health
Movement’s contributions to medicine. There is, thus, a strong reason beyond fair
equality of opportunity for promoting the inclusion of historically excluded groups
among researchers.
It is not enough that there is research on questions that the public needs to be
informed about. The research needs to be reliable. Reliability is not only a matter
of choosing the appropriate research design and executing it successfully. It also
depends on adherence to the ethical norms of science—such as intellectual hon-
esty, impartiality (which requires avoiding conflicts of interests), and openness.41
39. For a discussion scientific significance and how it shapes research agendas see Philip Kitcher,
Science, Truth, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 63-82.
40. Philip Kitcher, Science in a Democratic Society (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2011), 222-6.
41. The locus classicus for the norms of science is Robert King Merton, The Sociology of Science: The-
oretical and Empirical Investigations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 267-78. For a
more recent statement see David B. Resnik, The Price of Truth: How Money Affects the Norms of Science
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Recent studies suggest that the commercialization of science, especially in biomed-
ical sciences, facilitated by an expansive regime of intellectual property, tends to
undermine these norms. The erosion of these norms undermine the reliability of
scientific research by causing “funding bias”42 and unprecedented conflicts of inter-
ests, breeding secrecy and narrowing the scope of intellectual commons.43 To the
extent that the regime of intellectual property rights is relevant to the reliability of
knowledge production, it becomes a matter of justice over and above the standard
considerations that apply to property rights.
Scientists’ incentives also influence the reliability of research. According to the
current incentive structure of science, prestige accrues solely to original research. As
a result, researchers carry out few replication studies even though they can increase
the reliability of research by checking previous findings and discouraging fraud or
questionable research practices. Nevertheless, groups of scientists in several fields
have recently mobilized to overcome this state of affairs and carried out replication
studies. The results in psychology, cancer research, and economics have not been
encouraging and many landmark studies have failed to replicate.44
A key reason for these failures is the incentive to publish positive results and the
difficulty of publishing negative results.45 Another oft-cited source of failure is the
low statistical power of many studies. A study with high statistical power will be
less likely to be erroneous but will need more resources and time. Researchers, who
are incentivized to publish a lot, will be drawn to study designs with low statistical
power.46 In both cases scientists acting in ways that are rational given their incen-
tives leads to results that are harmful for the community. What needs to change
is the existing incentive structure.47 Public funding bodies can take active steps to
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 35-52.
42. Several individual studies and systematic reviews have established that trials funded by the phar-
maceutical industry are considerably more likely to produce results that favor the sponsor than inde-
pendently funded trials. For a recent systematic review see Andreas Lundh et al., “Industry Sponsor-
ship and Research Outcome,” Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, no. 2 (2017).
43. Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace The Commercialization of Higher Education (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 66-71; Sheldon Krimsky, Science in the Private Interest: Has
the Lure of Profits Corrupted Biomedical Research? (Lanham, Md.; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield,
2004), 27-52; Hans Radder, ed., “The Commodification of Academic Research. Science and the
Modern University,” in The Commodification of Academic Research: Science and the Modern University
(Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 231–258; Resnik, The Price of Truth, 77-108.
44. Open Science Collaboration, “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science,” Sci-
ence 349, no. 6251 (2015): aac4716; C. Glenn Begley and Lee M. Ellis, “Drug Development: Raise
Standards for Preclinical Cancer Research,” Nature 483, no. 7391 (2012): 531–533; Monya Baker
and Elie Dolgin, “Reproducibility Project Yields Muddy Results,” Nature 541, no. 7637 (2017): 269;
Colin F. Camerer et al., “Evaluating Replicability of Laboratory Experiments in Economics,” Science
351, no. 6280 (2016): 1433–1436.
45. Daniele Fanelli, “Do Pressures to Publish Increase Scientists’ Bias? An Empirical Support from
US States Data,” PLOS ONE 5, no. 4 (2010): e10271; Brian A. Nosek, Jeffrey R. Spies, and Matt
Motyl, “Scientific Utopia: II. Restructuring Incentives and Practices to Promote Truth Over Pub-
lishability,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 7, no. 6 (2012): 615–631.
46. Paul E. Smaldino and Richard McElreath, “The Natural Selection of Bad Science,” Royal Society
Open Science 3, no. 9 (2016): 160384.
47. Marcus R. Munafò et al., “A Manifesto for Reproducible Science,” Nature Human Behaviour
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facilitate this change by funding replication studies and open data initiatives and in
general supporting better epistemic practices.
The recent history of medical research on women’s health illustrates how the
epistemic basic structure can be unfairly organized and what can be done about it.
In her book Doing Harm, Maya Dusenbery argues that for much of the twentieth
century, biomedical research in the United states
“was disproportionately benefiting men. Science simply knew less about
women’s bodies and diseases that befell them—and, worse still, the
medical community was not attuned to this failure and seeking to cor-
rect it.”48
As Dusenbery shows, women were under-represented in or altogether excluded
from most clinical trials. Since the prevalence and symptoms of some diseases as
well as the effects of some medical treatments differ for men and women, this ex-
clusion mattered. To cite one example, up until recently the standard test used to
diagnose heart attacks was not as sensitive in women as it was in men. As a result,
women’s heart attacks were misdiagnosed and undertreated.49 Lack of research
also causes women to be less informed about their health and the measures they
can take. The Physicians’ Health Study, a major study with 22,071 subjects, had
concluded in 1989 that taking aspirin in low-doses reduced heart-disease risk for
those over fifty. This was, surely, an important piece of information that individuals
could make use of. For women, though, there was a snag: all experimental subjects
were men. It was not until 2005 when a new study, which included female subjects,
was published that women were in a position to make an informed decision about
whether to take aspirin or not. This study found that only women over sixty-five
would benefit from taking aspirin daily.50
There has been some progress on the production of knowledge about women’s
health thanks to measures similar to the ones I have proposed. The measures taken
include (a) increased funding for diseases more prevalent in women that were previ-
ously neglected; (b) funding bodies insisting on the inclusion of women and racial
minorities in clinical trials; (c) changes in journal practices, such as making gen-
der analysis of the data mandatory, and (d) improvements in the representation of
women in the profession.
(ii) The news media carries out research on public issues and plays a central role
in the dissemination of knowledge. How fairly and reliably it functions will be one
of the main determinants of people’s access to knowledge.51
1, no. 1 (2017): 0021.
48. Maya Dusenbery, Doing Harm: The Truth About How Bad Medicine and Lazy Science Leave
Women Dismissed, Misdiagnosed, and Sick (New York, NY: HarperOne, 2018), 23-4.
49. Dusenbery, Doing harm, 120.
50. Dusenbery, Doing harm, 42.
51. A comprehensive account would have to address the role of social media and other online media
in addition to traditional news media. I set them aside because they are in flux and our current
understanding is comparatively limited.
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The media’s sources of revenue shape the issues it covers and how it covers them.
Insofar as the media depends on sales and advertisement, it has incentives to pro-
vide more coverage of issues of concern to groups that have a larger advertising
potential.52 Thus, it will fail to serve the epistemic interests of minority groups and
those who are less well off. A financially dependent media will also be hesitant to
publish stories that harm the interests of their advertisers or their owners, who own
companies in other industries.53
The financial resources of the media have shrunk in the last decade. This has
undermined the quality of news coverage as it depends on reporters with the train-
ing, experience and time to develop stories. Lack of resources can also introduce
bias to news coverage, because it makes journalists more dependent on stories pro-
vided to them by government officials and public relations firms. As a result, what
the public is informed (or misinformed) about is shaped in light not of their inter-
ests but in those of the elite. Journalists’ dependence on these sources also makes it
more difficult for them to offer critical news coverage since doing so may hurt their
access to their primary news sources.54 Regulating the ownership of media and
making them financially more independent through public funding can improve
their coverage. There is a further reason for regulating media ownership, in partic-
ular, limiting concentration of ownership: High concentration of media ownership
is incompatible with media pluralism and democratic equality.55
Journalistic norms and practices also bear on the public’s opportunity to acquire
knowledge. One of the most strongly held journalistic norms is the norm of balance.
It is commonly interpreted to require presenting the competing sides to contentious
issues irrespective of their epistemic merits. The coverage of the alleged causal link
between the MMR vaccine and autism in the UK, and of climate change in the US
are prominent examples of how this norm has done significant damage. In both
cases, the proponents of the scientific consensus and those challenging it received
roughly equal coverage, thereby giving the public a deeply misleading view of both
the relevant facts and the distribution of views within the scientific community.56
Along with the factors discussed above, the demographic composition of jour-
nalists influences both which issues they cover and how they cover them. Women,
ethnic and racial minorities, and people from working class backgrounds are un-
52. David Strömberg, “Media and Politics,” Annual Review of Economics 7, no. 1 (2015): 178; Ben
H. Bagdikian, The New Media Monopoly, Revised ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 218-232.
53. Bagdikian, 233-256; Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Po-
litical Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002), 14-8.
54. Herman and Chomsky, 18-9; Robert W. McChesney, The Political Economy of Media: Enduring
Issues, Emerging Dilemmas (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008), 40-1.
55. For a sustained defense of the latter claim see C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration and Democ-
racy: Why Ownership Matters (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
56. For a critique of the coverage of climate change in the US see Maxwell T Boykoff and Jules M
Boykoff, “Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US Prestige Press,” Global Environmental Change
14, no. 2 (2004): 125–136. For the coverage of the MMR vaccine and the putative link with autism
see Tammy Boyce, Health, Risk and News: the MMR Vaccine and the Media (New York, N.Y.: Peter
Lang Publishing, 2007), 71-94.
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derrepresented in the journalism profession.57 This is to the detriment of disadvan-
taged groups leading to, for instance, lack of coverage of poverty58 and racialized
coverage of crime.59 Improving diversity in journalism can also be expected to im-
prove how well it serves the public.
(iii) My discussion of education will be brief given that most political philoso-
phers, including Rawls, accept that access to education is a requirement of justice.
Moreover, Rawls’s reasons for this position, which I discussed in Section 2, are in
line with the reasons offered for taking knowledge to be a primary good.60 Thus,
ensuring individual capability for assimilating the knowledge that has been pro-
duced and disseminated by the epistemic basic structure is already a requirement of
Rawls’s theory. However, thinking about education by itself and neglecting other
institutions of the epistemic basic structure gives us an incomplete account. Sup-
pose that production of knowledge is unreliable. Or, suppose that the production of
historical knowledge favors the dominant social group in society: history textbooks
gloss over injustices that determined how different groups currently fare; and there
is extensive research on the dominant group’s cultural achievements and little re-
search on those of other groups. In such cases, educational equality will only mean
that everyone gets to “learn” the same claims based on faulty research or distorted
and incomplete picture of the past.
There are further benefits to thinking about education with the rest of the epis-
temic basic structure in mind. While there may be a core set of intellectual skills
that citizens need under all circumstances, many of the skills they need depend on
how the rest of the epistemic basic structure operates. Consider, first, changes in
scientific practices. As new methods and technologies change scientific practices,
the background knowledge that laypeople need to understand scientific findings of
relevance to them will also change. For instance, the increasing availability of data
and technological tools for data analysis results in more research shared with the
public using statistical methods. This in turn makes greater demands on the pub-
lic’s statistical literacy. Similarly, the channels of dissemination are transformed
by advances in technology. The critical skills that citizens need in an environment
where social media is their main source of news is not the same as those they need
when their main source is the print media with its gate-keeping function. This ac-
57. American Society of News Editors, ‘How Diverse Are US Newsrooms?’,
https://googletrends.github.io/asne/ accessed 10 January 2018. The Cabinet Office, Unleash-
ing Aspiration: The Final Report of the Panel on Fair Access to the Professions, 2009. The data for
women, ethnic and racial minorities comes from the US. The data on class comes from the UK, but
the patterns in both countries are likely similar.
58. Dan Froomkin, “It Can’t Happen Here: Why is There so Little Coverage of Poverty?,” Nieman
Reports 66, no. 4 (2013): 40–43.
59. T. L. Dixon and D. Linz, “Overrepresentation and Underrepresentation of African Americans
and Latinos as Lawbreakers on Television News,” Journal of Communication 50, no. 2 (2000): 131–
154.
60. For a perspicuous account of the goods that education provides see Harry Brighouse et al.,
Educational Goods: Values, Evidence, and Decision Making (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2018).
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count also emphasizes the importance of opportunities for life-long learning. Since
the skills individuals need are changing due to changes in the rest of the epistemic
basic structure, they will need access to further education in their later years to be
able navigate the changing informational environment.
Finally, thinking about education with the rest of the epistemic basic struc-
ture in mind can inform the distribution of educational resources at all educational
levels–including the graduate level. The epistemic basic structure will serve the
epistemic needs of different social groups fairly only if their members can take part
in the production and dissemination of knowledge. Since their ability to do so de-
pends on the education they receive, this consideration should also figure in the
distribution of educational resources.
7 The Illiberalism Worry
It may be thought that pursuing a more just distribution of opportunity to acquire
knowledge requires the state deciding what is true, promulgating it and making sure
that everyone learns these truths—setting up a ministry of truth, as it were. Alter-
natively, it may be thought that the pursuit of a more just epistemic basic structure
requires intrusive interventions in the institutions that belong to it. The policies
discussed in the previous section suggest that these worries are unfounded and the
objectives put forth in this paper are compatible with basic liberal commitments.
Note first that many of the measures for making the epistemic basic structure of
a society fair and reliable, such as public funding for certain kinds of research, oper-
ates through offering incentives rather than criminalizing behavior. These measures
do not significantly restrict the range of actions available to citizens.61 Second, peo-
ple should only be provided with the opportunity to acquire knowledge. They are
free to decide whether they do so or not. Thus, this account does not impose a per-
fectionist ideal on them. Third, some of the measures I proposed, such as designing
intellectual property rights in a way that does not erode the ethos of science and
undermine the reliability of scientific research, or regulating media ownership to
limit monopolies, are ones that the state inevitably takes a position on. Property
rights depend on state enforcement; the question is which property rights the state
should be enforcing.
61. What if incentives are not enough to get scientists or journalists to work on topics that the
public needs to be informed about? This strikes me as a remote possibility. Both professions already
have intrinsic rewards and work serving the public would bring the further reward of social recogni-
tion. Coupled with financial incentives, which need not be very large since their primary role is to
coordinate research efforts and solve coordination problems, they should be sufficient. But suppose
incentives are not sufficient, or scientists and journalists will do such work only if they are offered
large incentives that lead to unfair inequalities. While both possibilities raise important questions,
they are not unique to the provision of scientific research or journalism. As Stanczyk has observed
these issues arise whenever justice demands the provision of some goods and services. The same is-
sues would arise, for instance, in the provision of health care as well. See Lucas Stanczyk, “Productive
Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 40, no. 2 (2012): 144–164.
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Consider the determinants of how well and fairly the media serves the public
considered in the previous section. They include the media’s sources of revenue,
the absolute amount of resources available, ownership patterns, journalistic norms
and practices, and the demographic composition of the profession. Improving the
media from the normative perspective defended in this article by tackling these
variables does not require heavy handed intervention that would violate freedom of
expression or other basic liberties. Many liberal democratic societies, such as Fin-
land and Denmark, already have media systems—which incorporate stricter reg-
ulations, public subsidies to newspapers and well-funded and autonomous public
broadcasting— that perform considerably better than laissez-faire media systems,
such as the American system, in terms of informativeness, diversity and fairness.62
Finally, ensuring diversity in the profession of journalism to counteract bias and
making sure that the epistemic needs of different groups are addressed is continu-
ous with the pursuit of fair equality of opportunity.
In the previous section, I suggested that the norms scientists and journalists ad-
here to affect the reliability of their work. It may be thought that ensuring that they
adhere to a set of norms will entail micromanaging them and constantly interfering
with their activities. However, such measures are not the only, or the most effec-
tive, way of promoting norms. Providing the background conditions that would
sustain desirable norms and incentivizing adherence to them is all that is required
by this account. Setting up intellectual property rights in a way that does not harm
the norms of science, or altering the incentives scientists face through funding are
not restrictive measures. A similar point applies to improving journalistic norms.
Epistemically more responsible journalistic norms can be promoted through in-
centives by either having public media agencies adhere to such norms or providing
subsidies to media institutions that adhere to them. Norms in journalism can also
be addressed by taking on the demand side of the problem. The education a well-
ordered epistemic basic structure provides its citizens would create a citizenry that
would be critical of journalism that does not follow certain norms and would indi-
rectly promote better journalism.
8 Conclusion
In this article, my question was what the duties of the epistemic basic structure were.
For this reason, I focused on propositional knowledge that is due to formal institu-
tions. This is not the only type of knowledge that matters from the perspective of
justice. Neither is the epistemic basic structure people’s only source of knowledge.
People develop a sense of what they can make of their lives by observing role
models. They reflect on how to live by conversing with others. They find out about
job opportunities through informal networks. They develop a sense of their col-
lective interests by getting together in associations. Their political participation
62. See James Curran et al., “Media System, Public Knowledge and Democracy: A Comparative
Study,” European Journal of Communication 24, no. 1 (2009): 5–26.
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depends on their listening and expressive skills. They find out about the everyday
experiences and needs of fellow citizens through individual interactions with them
or through social movements that inform the public. Or they remain ignorant of
how their fellow citizens fare, because, as Fricker argues, they discount their indi-
vidual testimony or because the conceptual resources that would make their social
experiences intelligible to others is missing. Thus, the knowledge that the epistemic
basic structure is responsible for is only a subset of the knowledge that people need
to live justly and to lead flourishing lives. How the rest of the basic structure is orga-
nized also deeply influences what they know. For instance, Elizabeth Anderson has
argued spatial and social segregation can make it difficult for disadvantaged groups
to find out about job opportunities.63 It also makes advantaged groups ignorant
of the problems of the disadvantaged.64 Thus, my account does not address every
form of injustice in the distribution of knowledge. A fully comprehensive account
of justice in the distribution of knowledge would have to address the demands of
epistemic justice on the rest of the basic structure as well.65
63. Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2010), 33-4.
64. Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, 98-9.
65. I am grateful to one of the referees for this journal for suggesting this formulation. I have not
addressed the role of the rest of the basic structure on the opportunity to acquire knowledge in this
paper, because it raises complex causal and normative issues that require separate treatment. It is
difficult to ascertain the ways in which the organization of the basic structure, by itself, influences
the opportunity to acquire knowledge. (Consider, for instance, how difficult it is to determine the
epistemic consequences of economic inequalities allowed by the difference principle.) Its role is also
much more context-sensitive: arrangements that are fine, say, in Sweden may be problematic in the
U.S. given their different histories and cultures. Finally, modifications to the basic structure of a so-
ciety, which is just according to Rawls’s principles of justice, that aim to improve people’s opportunity
to acquire knowledge will be likely to be in tension with other requirements of justice.
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